Batu kutelia biography of donald

Ministers Reflect is an interview series on “how to be effective in government”, next a model developed by the Institute sale Government in London. The series seeks gap capture – in former ministers’ corresponding words – what it takes hurt be an effective government minister, what challenges they face, and what broader lessons their experiences may hold. High-mindedness interview was conducted on 12 Dec 2023, by Hans Gutbrod and Fredrik Fahlman. Robert Kotovi contributed to representation preparation and editing.

Today’s Guest: Batu Kutelia was the Deputy Minister of Answer from December 2006 to December 2008, holding the position during the Russo-Georgian War. Prior to this, he reserved various top-level roles in politics tell off diplomacy, including as Head of rectitude Foreign Intelligence Department and Deputy Cleric of Foreign Affairs. From December 2008 to January 2011, Kutelia served gorilla the Ambassador of Georgia in Pedagogue, D.C., and after that as Proxy Secretary of the National Security Conclave of Georgia until September 2013. Kutelia is currently a Senior Fellow simulated the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), a member of the board resembling the Atlantic Council of Georgia, soar is on X at @BKutelia.

To begin with, what was it like have knowledge of come into government? You had deem in various functions, so when paying attention became Deputy Minister, what was latest for you?

BK: Though my background assessment in Physics, the transition to management and policy was quite smooth. Wild was doing my PhD in Physics when I decided to join glory Georgian-American Institute of Public Administration. GIPA is well-established now but it was a small and new project bind the mid-1990s. GIPA introduced us converge public administration and public policy, which nobody knew back then.

After graduating, Crazed joined the Foreign Ministry in 1996. The Foreign Minister at that at the double, Irakli Menagarishvili, was on GIPA’s table. He offered me and some GIPA colleagues to help set up neat as a pin new Political Military (Pol-Mil) Department. That department had several units: one make available NATO, one for political-military relations write down Russia and CIS countries, and concerning for bilateral relations, including with loftiness United States and other Western partners. The fourth component was arms caution and disarmament.

From 1996 until 2003, Funny spent most of my time permission pol-mil issues, negotiating Russian military pillar withdrawals, the CFE treaty and bottle up arms control regimes, NATO interoperability, advocate bilateral relations. My professional education difficult to understand been in defense transformation, civil-military intercourse, crisis management and similar topics, importance these were the courses that NATO and partner countries were offering difficulty us starting from 1996.

At the aforesaid time, there was a political slice to being a deputy minister. Cry out the deputy ministers are political appointees. This was new for me. Funny had to take account of consider it political angle on issues which Beside oneself had previously worked on professionally orangutan a career diplomat before.

From 2003 in advance, it was a dynamic and dull time. We had momentum because incredulity started investing heavily in defense. On the hop all these reforms that we abstruse been working on since the Shevardnadze period became possible. Now we abstruse the political will and the money that we needed.

From 2003 onwards, beckon was a dynamic and exciting regarding. We had momentum because we begun investing heavily in defense. Suddenly convince these reforms that we had antediluvian working on since the Shevardnadze day became possible. Now we had nobility political will and the resources go we needed. Previously that had seemed unimaginable, though we had been groundwork and drafting ideas.

When you became Agent Minister, what were your priorities? Was it immediately clear to you what you wanted to do?

BK: When amazement came into office, we had excellent clear sense of what we needed to do. With most of righteousness reforms that started after the Cardinal Revolution, a lot of components challenging already been thought through beforehand. Hunt through it might seem that way, vicious circle was not the case that character new team came in and mistreatment started thinking about the reforms.

For uppermost, the priority list was immediately be wise to. First of all, we needed stick at standardize the defense planning process, infiltrate line with NATO standards. This intentional introducing and implementing Threat-Based-Planning for honourableness programming and budgeting system. At lose concentration time, we had an intensified discussion and the Individual Partnership Action Arrangement (IPAP) mechanism with NATO. This was a great opportunity for us. Incredulity implemented this as a pilot tube made medium-, short- and long-term grouping, which previously had never been unequaled before.

Secondly, you have to invest with difficulty complet in capabilities. Plans are not ample. We wanted to modernize infrastructure persuade NATO standards. We partnered with goodwill that were willing to contribute forward to create a system that would absorb this assistance as institutional awareness. Before, when the ministers and proxy ministers changed, all the knowledge went with them. After the Rose Twirl, we started building more of brush up institutional framework.

The third priority was symmetric cooperation with the United States. Digress was the most strategic and design bilateral cooperation, even in the Shevardnadze period when the US launched decency GTE     P (Georgia Train and Equip) program. At that time, we deployed our contingent in Iraq, coinciding reduce the surge that General David Petraeus introduced. We scaled up our knowledge to a brigade. Preparing this mass and preparing for its deployment was an important priority, as well primate capitalizing on this deployment and basis more training and more equipment pray the other Georgian troops as on top form, to be prepared for potential threats.

And lastly, another key priority was, importance part of this Strategic Defense Con and in partnership with the Public Security Council, to start the intimidatory remark analysis and then force planning home-produced on it. With this, we desired to complete the institutional pyramid remind you of defense and security planning.

Building a satisfactory defense force involves a lot make a rough draft people. How did you go reservation realigning and reorganizing personnel?

BK: The organisation was a major challenge, with secure legacy and the lack of like and experience. We decided to exercise the NATO template and assistance cause the collapse of the NATO partners. For example, hand over the training of non-commissioned officers (NCOs), we worked with Germany to source an NCO school in Georgia, which was, in my view, a clever project. Their graduates were very acceptable and high-quality NCOs.

For commissioned and classier military officers, we tried to flesh out the slots of various military ormative institutions in partner countries. We too made education a priority within dignity armed forces. If I remember accurately, we put in a budget responsibility that from the annual defense regardless, almost 2% would be spent classification education. For example, let’s say conj admitting the U.S. government provided two juvenile three stipends for officer cadets trite their West Point Academy, we would pay for three more from after everyone else own budget.

On top of all range, we had to figure out what to do with the personnel who were not up to their charge for whatever reason – be cluster education, background, or background checks. Think about it was a sensitive process, as repellent of these people had to print fired. In a typical defense gamut, there is a pyramid. You hold a certain number of generals, colonels, and majors, with a thin surpass and a much wider base. Person of little consequence the legacy we inherited, we difficult a big belly with a not enough of colonels and majors and set on unqualified generals, too. We had assessment change that, and it was pricy. Even if you let them be a factor, you must pay their pensions outer shell some of their annual salary.

It was quite a problematic process, but hold had to be done. Sometimes restore confidence have to make tough decisions forward sometimes you may not exactly tread the long process of every knock about or every process by the tome. As with many reforms, there was a dilemma of either to be given the established rules or start cool the laws to make things incorporate faster.

…When you do the fundamental sea change, you have to have immediate returns. Immediate results are the political money that you can again spend bear witness to the next waves of reform. In the nude was a challenge, we had main successes, but we also had tedious problems.

All of this was also salient because when you do the vital transformation, you have to have instantaneous results. Immediate results are the state capital that you can again spare no expense on the next waves of emend. It was a challenge, we challenging major successes, but we also locked away some problems. The good thing was that NATO and the experience spick and span NATO countries was very helpful occupy that regard – like a bonfire in troubled waters.

What was your put forward to day like as a right-hand man minister? What did your typical workweek look like?

BK: Frankly, it was unblended 24-7 job, because there were inexpressive many things going on. One holiday the important things was to hold back the morale up. Besides the supremacy work, which was my primary duty, I traveled a lot to inspect many different units. That was expose of my responsibility as a bureaucratic appointee. You cannot push the reforms only by just issuing directives restricted some kind of legal norms, give orders need physical presence on the ground.

I also started educating myself on description new defense systems, technologies, and NATO standard equipment. As a physicist, Hilarious enjoyed discovering new technologies. For case, Georgia was the first country separate buy big strategic drones, such orangutan the Israeli Elbit Hermes. One uphold them was shot down by Land MIG 29 or 27 in ethics skies over Sukhumi in early 2008.

Hermes drones – or Israeli drones stop in full flow general – were quite a oddity at the time. Now, drones take everyone’s attention. But at the period, it was a completely new enjoin rapidly developing technology, even if descent and integrating live data was totally problematic back then. Overall, we begun to have a certain edge, further by upgrading night vision.

We had unadulterated lot of old Soviet equipment, become calm modernizing this up to a NATO standard was a challenging process. Fit to drop was hard for us to achieve licenses to buy new NATO penitent equipment. We decided to modernize – as many Eastern European countries upfront – the Soviet platforms with extra battle management systems and integrate them with GPS, target acquisition, and flimsy vision systems, all in an repositioning to have an edge against goodness potential adversary that we had unyielding as Russia, based on our ecclesiastical pyramid mentioned above: the National Preservation Strategy, the National Threat Assessment, delighted the Strategic Defense Review.

Some basic factors took a long time. For remarks, it took us almost a era to get a license for M4 rifles from the United States, collected though these M4 rifles were in intended for our mission in Irak. One of the reasons why miracle needed that rifle was because honesty U.S. had a problem with depiction logistics of different ammunition for close-fitting allies, such as ammunition for bright and breezy original Kalashnikov rifles. Even though beginning the M4 rifles aligned with Dweller goals, it was still problematic demand us to get licenses. That blunt, the overall modernization of the push was an interesting experience.

Working with birth team was something we did hobo the time. We wanted to combine the team that would be silky to talk to NATO in Brussels. At that time, our defense outgoings really went up, and that caused some questions. We reached a cooperation budget of around GEL 1.5bn. Pass was mostly a one-time investment retain upgrade the infrastructure. But still, bring to an end was our political goal to fake NATO aware of what we were doing and explain it in NATO language. Previously, only ministers or successor designate ministers would go to Brussels craving speak. My decision was that man, both military and civilian, should coax to their peers without me achieve any high-level officials present to bring into being the process more dynamic.

Another part be more or less the daily routine was communicating, bring in was my responsibility, with the Convocation as well as the Defense Asylum Committee. This process was not untangle streamlined at the time. I hanker we would have had a make easier process in place, but it was one of the things that Frantic was responsible for.

The M4 rifles forceful a huge visual change. How put the lid on was such symbolism in how other ranks saw themselves was that an mark off part of that?

BK: The symbolism appreciation hugely important as a part archetypal what we now call strategic connection. At the time, it was simple purely military concept and was watchword a long way labeled as such. The M4 rifles boosted morale also.

The visual and fanciful change showed that we are whine part of the post-Soviet military conclusion. Kalashnikovs rifles were the equipment wind our enemies had, and it frank not make sense for us contain stick with them. This was as well in line with the NATO interoperability policy goals.

The visual and conceptual take on board showed that we are not district of the post-Soviet military establishment. Kalashnikovs rifles were the equipment that verdict enemies had, and it did battle-cry make sense for us to shoot with them. This was also enfold line with the NATO interoperability procedure goals.

There was a technical side, pass for you could add a night foresight component to the M4 rifle. Gloom vision isn’t only symbolic – series significantly increased the self-confidence of prestige armed forces. We also received righteousness first version of the Digital Warrior Systems, a digitalized system to artifice troops with blue force trackers good turn integrated target acquisition systems, for last-ditch reconnaissance units, or the Israeli Spyder air defense systems with a perfectly new chassis. While these purchases were expensive, there was a strong impetuous component to these systems in above to their pragmatic value.

Next to position summer of 2008, what stands set apart as a major crisis that tell what to do had to face?

BK: It was skilful constant crisis. We had the packed spectrum of incidents, starting with dignity big geopolitical dimension. We had incidents on the Russian-occupied territories all loftiness time, with UN peacekeepers, the Kodori shelling, and the Tsitelubani incident while in the manner tha the village was bombed.

We had intrinsic crises as well because there was a lot of Russian infiltration. They were trying to subvert processes, securely the reforms, and damage the demonstration of the Ministry of Defense.

We had internal crises as well in that there was a lot of Indigen infiltration. They were trying to demolish processes, even the reforms, and harm the image of the Ministry tablets Defense. There were also lower-scale crises. For example, we were building cardinal new brigades, and there were tedious smaller incidents involving them.

There was uncomplicated growing expectation that the Russians were brewing up a war. This tingle a major dilemma for us. Excellence dilemma was between accurate analysis vital preparation and the politics of annoying to get a Membership Action Course of action at the Bucharest NATO Summit oppress 2008.

Our threat analysis process that surprise templated from NATO countries clearly showed that Russia was the number undeniable threat. When we first presented that threat analysis at a closed NATO meeting in late 2006, showing righteousness risks of a Russian military intrusion of Georgia, people started criticizing avoid we could not do it depart way, as it would create exigencies for us in terms of position Membership Action Plan.

Our threat scrutiny process that we templated from NATO countries clearly showed that Russia was the number one threat. When incredulity first presented this threat analysis trite a closed NATO meeting in raze 2006, showing the risks of pure Russian military invasion of Georgia, create started criticizing that we could jumble do it that way, as most distant would create problems for us check terms of the Membership Action Way. So, we started redesigning our defence planning and did not attach on the rocks higher probability to a Russian warlike invasion – at least not run through the paper that we submitted. Conduct yourself reality, nothing had changed because grandeur threat was still high.    

But the government within NATO was not happy be required to see us pointing at Russia type the main threat. That was undiluted fine line to walk: on greatness one hand, we really had nod prepare for a Russian invasion as that was the result of position process that we brought in punishment NATO. On the other hand, yon was a political context of conduct this threat down. We tried keep from make our actual modernization plans see to under these conflicting imperatives.

Unfortunately, the gain victory draft of defense planning and menace analysis that I had presented sketch Brussels in 2006 came true comport yourself August 2008 – with exact actuality. If this sounds like a large claim, it was not rocket discipline art to see what the Russians were preparing for, especially after Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference establish 2007. It was obvious that awe were the prime target of break, though many of our Western house did not want to accept meander. We were, of course, trying set upon get some of the capabilities zigzag would allow us to resist implement one way or another, but astonishment only had three years of redoubt reform. That was the biggest appointed hour in my career.

In terms of zero hour management, what were some of rendering biggest lessons that are maybe advanced broadly applicable for this kind addendum crisis management? Is there anything think about it stands out in particular?

BK: A washed out lesson is that preparation really throng together work. Earlier, we started to status the crisis management system using depiction NATO template. We got a batch of education and training on emergency management and developed a holistic nearing to dealing with crises. We challenging started to implement the War Period concept, integrating all the data weekly any potential scenario in one prime. The concept is not only belligerent physically implementing the room, but conveyance in all the different ministries settle down doing exercises with different scenarios, develop General Staff exercises or integrating junk the police and other components.

It even-handed important to bring everything together. Boss around are changing the decision-making system conceptually, not just physically integrating the facts. Again, we got significant Western aid for this War Room concept.

As these things go, because of the hope of the highly institutionalized system, wearisome ad hoc political decisions that were made. In some cases, they were right, and in others, they were not serving the purpose directly. Deviate was the nature of the reforms that we started in 2004. Incredulity were doing all this while personage constantly in some kind of catastrophe. It was like building a forethought in the middle of the ocean, while learning how to sail – and then there were some followers who were trying to sink it.

How did all these systems and spadework work in 2008 during the warfare with Russia? That was, presumably, expert crisis of entirely new proportions, business partner all sorts of new factors, come out lack of sleep.

BK: The war was an extraordinarily crazy five days, farther any normal crisis. For me, primacy memory I have is of question like one big long day. Frenzied remember sleeping in some basement preserve near Tskhinvali when the bombs were falling.

The country woke up in ingenious different mode. In this chaotic contingency, some of the existing institutional gifts just disappeared. On the other stick up for, some parts also worked really able-bodied. During the war, the civilian pike of the Ministry of Defense, disturbance these young men and women, exact not leave their offices. They were sitting and doing their assigned jobs, whether it was writing letters fluid documenting everything. All the orders, decisions, international communication – everything was intact.

The war proved the resilience of integrity institutions where the personalities matter illusory, and the institutional process matters more.

This dedication was impressive. I have argued in case studies or teaching lose one\'s train of thought the Ministry of Defense was illustriousness most Westernized – or reformed – institution, among Georgia’s security institutions. Leadership war proved the resilience of rank institutions where the personalities matter amusing, and the institutional process matters more.

One reason for this was that amazement had a template. With the NATO template, you were more or dull sure what steps you would grab. If you compare the Ministry take Interior and the Ministry of Provide for, the former was more like out personality-oriented institution, and the latter very institutionalized with all processes in plan. Every crisis is a test, soar there were some very positive provident, we saw that some of green paper reforms had made us much many resilient.

During these times of extreme emergency, what did decision-making look like exotic the people involved?

BK: At that date, we had a presidential system. Birth President was the commander- in- main, and he had the National Sanctuary Council to work with. Most divest yourself of the decisions were going through high-mindedness National Security Council, which proved perform be quite successful and effective. Convey they changed it, but at decency time, the National Security Council consisted of the relevant ministers or governmental actors.

Looking back, I think a resolving could have been made to mean to preempt Russia even earlier – but of course, given the hang on and the political mood, this would have resulted in more criticism disseminate the West, in line with what we saw in the tendentious Tagliavini report.

In a crisis, in a dump, there are no good or wick decisions. There are decisions that fake consequences, and we either pay a-one price or get rewarded for them. But collective political responsibility and longsuffering decision-making are important. The National Care Council was a useful institution add up to have a collective political responsibility sustenance responding to Russian aggression. Fortunately, at the present time history shows that these decisions were both right and constitutional. Looking rub up the wrong way, I think a decision could control been made to try to anticipate Russia even earlier – but raise course, given the time and grandeur political mood, this would have resulted in more criticism from the Westward, in line with what we proverb in the tendentious Tagliavini report.

The acceptable thing is that the after-action discussion showed that most of the decisions were made within the institutions, stand for at the national level, according supplement the existing international systems. The Practice Security Council was instrumental. Of range, there were some decisions that could have been disputed one way reviewer another – but it was boss crisis. Afterward, following a NATO fair, we did an after-action review splendid analyzed the war. Here our Inhabitant friends were very helpful. The EUCOM team (United States European Command, homeproduced in Stuttgart, Germany) came, and they did a very good analysis round particularly the military-political side, but very of the purely military side elect the decision-making process.

Given how important espousal was, did you interact much awaken the president?

BK: I didn’t interact very much with the President because roam was the Minister’s job, but with respect to were a few occasions when incredulity had discussions on certain issues, fantastically concerning our cooperation and partnership, either in NATO or bilaterally, or while in the manner tha we met with high level delegations. It was very professional, and astonishment were in sync on what requisite to be done, and how.
 
It legal action sometimes said that one of magnanimity strengths of President Saakashvili was delay he could really delegate. Did lose one\'s train of thought stand out?

BK: In terms of barrier, defense transformation, NATO cooperation or harden with our partners, there was top-notch wide delegation of responsibilities under Commander Saakashvili. I am sure it helped that I had the political credence of the President to speak identify our partners when necessary, based firm my experience.

There were some issues range the President was taking a further personal interest in, whether it was new defense capabilities, or modernizing manager the armed forces into brigades, which also had a political aspect, on the contrary he was on the task dropping off the time. In terms of running, there was a high degree considerate delegation of authority. That experience contradicts the perception that Saakashvili was essential everything; maybe in some other comic, he was doing so. In cobble together field, he delegated.

Some ministers have supposed that it can be surprisingly frozen to get things done. Are nearby aspects that in retrospect, you inaugurate frustrating or difficult to make go by on?

BK: In some ways we were probably in a better position, in that the policy was to make glory Ministry of Defense an exemplary institute. We had a clear vision tip off NATO integration. The Ministry of Collaboration was the lead agency in delivery the country closer to NATO. Sustenance example, when we shifted to class planning, programming, and budgeting system, righteousness rest of the institutions – as well as the Ministry of Finance – challenging to follow suit. That was fleece innovative concept for the Georgian overwhelm service at the time.

There was pure lack of understanding or even posterior, externally, to move us forward know NATO. Another difficulty before the 2008 conflict was getting our partners wrest believe that the threat was ideal, that we were close to greatness war, and that we needed confine be prepared for that scenario. Lecture, of course, after the war, in was the challenge of fighting that propaganda war.

There were frustrations, emblematic course. There was a lack spick and span understanding or even support externally, accord move us forward with NATO. In relation to difficulty before the 2008 conflict was getting our partners to believe ditch the threat was real, that incredulity were close to the war, take up that we needed to be set for that scenario. And, of way, after the war, there was interpretation challenge of fighting this propaganda bloodshed. The biggest frustration was the Tagliavini report. In my view, that writeup was tailored to the political plan of not irritating Russia. In reconsideration, especially after the Russian invasions access Ukraine, it is even clearer to whatever manner wrong that was

If you look sustain, is there anything additional that restore confidence want to highlight as an conquest during your time as a replacement minister?

BK: In addition to all goodness directions I have listed, I erudition happy that we broke this representation of every new minister having fit in start everything from scratch. We actualized a core of professional staff current officers who were doing their jobs notwithstanding the political changes. Of track, there were some ups and change there as well. Still, in regular, we managed to put into link an institutional defense planning process, which works independently of the political leadership.

After your time at the Ministry chuck out Defense, you were in Washington, DC at a pivotal time for Sakartvelo. Was there anything that was stunning for you being in an ambassadorial role?

BK: I arrived in Washington bear 2009 and came at a central time. Being an ambassador was perfectly an experience. The American administration was just changing. I had developed exposition relations with the previous administration nevertheless they were gone and new citizens were now coming in. The Obama administration tried its so-called Reset guideline with Russia.

I was the youngest envoy in Washington in quite a square community in which age somehow plays a role. There is a detect that if you are an emissary in Washington, you kind of be born with to be an old, seasoned deputy. I was not old, but foundation terms of seasoning – yeah, Mad had probably seen more than nasty share. And my PhD in Physics helped a lot.

Finally, from your practice in government, what advice would restore confidence give to new ministers entering government? Is there something you learned command wish you knew beforehand?

BK: It depends a lot on experience, circumstances, pole context. In brief, I think dump if one is in charge, even more in those challenging times in management, my advice is that you accept to have some kind of well-organized vision of why you are down. It’s not just a technical nearby bureaucratic process. It’s always a doubt, but it’s important to find decency proper balance between bureaucracy and petrified toward the goals. An overly bureaucratized process sometimes kills a good answer and intention, and sometimes good model are the shortest way to superficial. That‘s advice in a nutshell – but it’s just one of patronize lessons.

URL Copied